A letter written by 29 prominent American scientists in support of the recent nuclear deal with Iran fails to address political aspects of the deal or ambiguities in the wording of the deal, Emily Landau, a leading nuclear nonproliferation expert, wrote in an analysis today in The Times of Israel. While acknowledging that the signers of the letter are “an impressive group of individuals,” Landau, the head of the arms control program at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, noted that the scientists’ verdict on the deal “must be assessed on its merits,” not merely on the scientists’ reputations.
If this highly respected group of scientists is not aware, for example, that the 24-day cap on Iran’s ability to delay an investigation into a facility suspected of supporting clandestine activities could actually be much longer than that, why would we attribute any more authority to this letter than to other sources making similar arguments to support the deal? If the group had scrutinized paragraphs 75-76 in the Access section – that are not about science, but rather politics – they would have seen that Iran’s ability to play for time regarding inspections of suspicious military facilities begins when the IAEA first submits its concerns, and waits for Iran’s clarification. The 24-day count begins only after that, if and when the IAEA makes a request for access; but the preliminary phase has no time limit.
And there are additional dangerous ambiguities in the deal. There are holes and loopholes and flaws that Iran can abuse for its purposes. So when one assesses the deal, the scientific aspects are certainly important, but that is not where the assessment ends. Rather, there is a need to consider the history of dealing with Iran, and the experience gained thereby. Iran has shown its determination not only to hold on to its vast nuclear infrastructure and breakout capability, but continues its highly aggressive attitude toward the US and the Middle East. Moreover, Iran has over the years perfected tactics of playing for time, and has made it very clear that it will not tolerate inspections at its military sites where suspicions are that it has worked on a military nuclear capability. If pressed on inspections in the coming years, Iran will most likely continue to evade and play for time, and the deal dangerously provides ample room for Iran to do so.
Indeed, Iran might very well be able to escape such inspections altogether. The ambiguous language in this regard – “implement the necessary means” – leaves us wondering whether Iran will ultimately be forced to admit inspectors into its facilities, or whether the language provides it a way out. And Iran’s emphatic rejection of such inspections gives no cause for complacency. So can one really say – as the scientists do – that the deal provides “effective challenge inspection for the suspected activities of greatest concern”? Hardly.
Landau pointed out that the scientists’ letter assumes that a poorly-defined mechanism for Iran fulling revealing any possible military dimensions of its past nuclear research will work. She also noted that the scientist don’t question whether there will be the political will to enforce the provisions of the deal in the event of Iranian violations. Even the will to re-impose sanctions exists, a provision of the deal allows Iran to back out if sanctions are re-imposed.
At the end of her analysis, Landau pointed out that one of the signers of the letter, Siegfried Hecker, had been invited by North Korea to view its new enrichment facilities in 2010, built after North Korea had exited the 1994 Agreed Framework to limit its nuclear program, leading her to ask, “Shouldn’t the experience of North Korea have impressed upon this scientist how dangerous proliferators can deceive the international community, even after making deals?”
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