In an essay for Politico Magazine, former State Department advisor Aaron David Miller called the American-Israeli diplomatic relationship “too big to fail.” Among other observations, Miller writes that the current turmoil in the Middle East underscores America’s “need for traditional friends who are able to offer stability,” and that with the twin threats of Sunni jihadis and Iranian-backed terror organizations, “Israel is now more aligned with key Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, and Egypt too.”

Three of his reasons follow:

First, the Middle East is melting down at a rate nobody could ever have predicted. And despite the risks this turbulence may pose to Israel’s own Israeli security interests, the Middle East muddle is good for the U.S.-Israeli relationship. The behavior of various Arab actors—ISIL, Assad, Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, even Egypt—reinforces the value affinity that binds Israel and the United States and to a great extent puts them together in the same trench. When Islamic State terrorists are beheading Americans and Syria is murdering thousands of its own people with barrel bombs and chemical weapons, Israeli transgressions–settlement activity, occupation policies—pale by comparison. This was precisely the same dynamic that brought the two countries together in the wake of 9/11–both attacked by suicide terrorists. In essence these Arab actors become the most effective talking points arguing for very close U.S.-Israel ties.

Second, the Middle East meltdown has demonstrated the need for traditional friends who are able to offer stability and continuity. The Arab monarchs have weathered the Arab spring in surprisingly good shape. It’s no coincidence that President Obama made his pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia to pay his respects to the new king with a bipartisan delegation of wise men in tow. It’s no shocker the UAE has emerged as a key U.S. ally, and it’s not much of a news flash that Qatar—at times the bad boy of the Middle East—is viewed as useful American ally for its air base and location. Israel—the only country in the region where we could absolutely predict that U.S. aircraft could be guaranteed the right to land 24 hours from now—is obviously a key ally in a region where the United States needs such a base badly. And what’s more, because of common threats—namely jihadi terror and Iran—Israel is now more aligned with key Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, and Egypt too.

Third, if the United States wants to manage the key issues and conflicts in the region and retain its previous influence (now much deflated) it will have to find a way to work with the Israelis. That doesn’t mean rolling over to every Israeli policy preference or undermining American interests. But there is no way we can address the Iranian nuclear issue—agreement or not—let alone resolve the Palestinian issue without Israeli help and acquiescence. U.S. presidents (Nixon; Ford; Carter; Bush 41; Clinton; Bush 43) have wrestled with Israeli Prime Ministers (Rabin; Begin; Shamir; Netanyahu; Sharon) before and managed to cooperate and achieve significant successes in matters of peace and war. America will have no choice but to do so again, however difficult its Israeli partner may prove to be.

In ISIS: Can the West Win Without a Ground Game?, which was published in the October 2014 issue of The Tower Magazine, Jonathan Spyer pointed to the need for the United States to coordinate with its allies, including Israel and the moderate Arab states, to fight off the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, while keeping Iran at bay.

Most obviously, there is a line of pro-American states along the southern side of the arena of the war. These are Israel, Jordan, and in a far more partial and problematic way, Saudi Arabia. Both Israel and Jordan have demonstrated that they are able to successfully contain the spread of the chaos coming out of the north. Both are well-organized states with powerful militaries and intelligence structures. Jordan has clearly benefitted from the deployment of U.S. special forces to prevent incursions by the I.S. Israel has also made clear that its resources will be available to assist the Jordanians should this be required. (Egypt, too, while not in the immediate vicinity of the conflict, can be a silent partner as well—as its campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood and tough line against Hamas have shown, it is nothing if not a virulent opponent to political Islam.)

This is what the proper coordination of allied states is supposed to look like. And it works in containing the conflict. To the east of the war’s arena is of course Iran. To its west is the Mediterranean Sea. To its north is a long, contiguous line of Kurdish control, shared between the Kurdish Regional Government of President Massoud Barzani in northern Iraq, as well as the three enclaves created by the PKK-linked Democratic Union Party (PYD) in northern Syria. The YPG militia, which is the military force in these enclaves, has fought the I.S. almost since its inception, and has largely prevailed in keeping the jihadis out of the Kurdish areas.

[Photo: Miller Center / Flickr ]