Iran “did not inform” the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of all the details it was obligated to under the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) that Iran is a signatory to, bragged a former head of the country’s Atomic Energy Organization in an interview last month. The interview was translated this week.

Fereydoon Abbasi, who ran the organization under former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, also admitted to the Iranian newspaper Khorasan that developments in the Arak heavy water reactor were “concealed” from the watchdog organization, according to a translation by the Middle East Media Research Institute.

Regarding the Design Information Questionnaire [DIQ] that the IAEA always requests as information related to the planning and progress of Iran’s facilities, Iran always submits this information to the IAEA. However, at one point we did not inform [the IAEA] about the DIQ, because the Additional Protocol [of the NPT that allows the IAEA to conduct monthly snap inspections to detect violations] was not ratified [by Iran’s Majlis].
The reason for this was that the IAEA inspector would honestly report, for instance, that a certain part or a certain pump had yet to arrive [in Iran], or to be installed. As a result, the intelligence agency receives this information [from the IAEA and then] searches the globe for companies that make the pump, and pressures them. They would pressure that country or company not to transfer the parts or equipment to Iran, or would allow them to do so [only] after sabotaging [the parts]… For instance, if it was an electronic system, they would infect it with a virus, or plant explosives in it, or even alter the type of components, in order to paralyze [Iran’s] system.

In its background to the interview, MEMRI observed, “It is notable that since 2006, Iran has provided the IAEA with no information on its activity at Arak, in violation of the agency’s demands.”

While Abbasi gave an excuse for Iran’s non-compliance this time, Iran’s history with the IAEA has been fraught with deception.

In 2004, Iran admitted that “it had secretly purchased components for its nuclear program from a network of international suppliers,” but only when it was confronted with a report that IAEA had discovered the activity. Though Iran acknowledged the covert transaction it still insisted that its nuclear program was for peaceful purpose only. However, an unnamed American official said, “The Iranians are still stonewalling.” A few days later, Iran changed its story claiming that its activities did not need to be reported. Later in the year, after pledging to suspend its nuclear program, the IAEA found that Iran continued its nuclear work and reported that there was “continuing evidence that Iran misled inspectors with many of its early claims.”

The Arak reactor is of particular concern as it is capable of producing plutonium, a fissionable element, capable of fueling a nuclear bomb, obviating the need for enriching uranium. Despite the interim agreement signed in November between Iran and the P5+1 on Iran’s nuclear program, Iran has continued building the reactor and has declared that it will not dismantle or even downgrade it. The continued non-disclosure of its activities at Arak suggests that Iran is hiding the true extent of its nuclear program.

In the December 2013 issue of The Tower Magazine, Emanuele Ottolenghi explained why a bad deal with Iran would make an Israeli strike on Iran more likely.

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